Gneezy et al. (2003) offer a partial explanation for the wage gap between men and women. In an experiment they found that women react less to competitive incentives. The task they used in their experiment can however be considered a male task. This allows for an interpretation of their results as stemming from stereotype threat rather than from a general behavioural tendency of women. We replicate the experiment and extend it by a treatment with a gender neutral task. For the male task we replicate the results from Gneezy et al. (2003), but for the neutral task women react as strongly to incentives than men. Our findings suggest a stereotype threat explanation. Women tend not to compete with men in areas where they (rightly or wrongly) think that they will lose anyway.
Introduction
The gender wage gap and the limited success of women in reaching top positions in management cause continuous and emotional discussions in academia as well as in every-day life. Various explanations ranging from discrimination (e.g. Blau & Kahn 1994) to women´s negotiation behaviour (e.g. Babcock & Laschever 2003) have been offered. Recently a new strand of literature (Gneezy et al. 2003 , Gneezy & Rustichini 2004 , Niederle & Vesterlund 2007 ) has added another possibility: Women compete less than men and even less when competing against men. Moreover women, when given the choice, prefer less competitive environments.
An initial benchmark was set by Gneezy et al. (2003) . Students at the Technion in Haifa had to solve maze games in groups of six. Each student had to solve as many mazes as possible within a given time span. The experiment contained several treatments which varied in the sex composition of the group and the payoff schemes for the participants. In the Piece Rate treatment (baseline treatment) each group was composed of three men and three women. Each subject was given a fixed amount of money per solved maze. The same composition of groups holds for the Mixed Tournament and the Random Pay treatment. There however, only one participant received a compensation of six times the piece rate. In the Mixed Tournament treatment the amount was given to the subject with the highest performance. In the Random Pay treatment the amount was given to a randomly drawn participant. The results show that men perform slightly better than women in the non-competitive treatments (Piece Rate and Random Pay). But more important the performance of men increases significantly between the non-competitive treatments and the competitive treatment (Mixed Tournament) while women's performance does not. 2 The results look different when looking at a fourth treatment with the same payoff scheme than in the Mixed Tournament treatment, but with the group being composed of a single sex only (Single Sex Tournament). Still, women perform less well than men, but in the Single Sex Tournament treatment women are increasing their performance just like men do.
In another study, Gneezy & Rustichini (2004) look at competitive attitudes of children at young age when performing in a running task. While the performance of boys and girls was roughly equal when time on a 40m sprint was taken individually it increased significantly with the boys but not with the girls, when they were competing with each other by running in pairs. Girls did not even increase their performance when competing in single sex pairs.
2 Gender differences in risk taking can not be the explanation because the amount of risk does not change between the Random Pay and the Mixed Tournament treatment.
The results were further qualified by Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) who focussed their investigation on the question of self-selection into tournaments. In a clever design they measured performance in a summation task and participants' willingness to submit this performance to a tournament payment scheme or not. Their main result is that men and woman perform equally well in the piece rate payment scheme and also equally increase their performance in a tournament payment scheme. However, if subjects were allowed to select the payment scheme, significantly more men than woman selected the tournament scheme.
Our paper contributes to this literature by looking at an important factor which has so far been neglected: the task in which subjects compete. We assume that women compete less in tasks that are perceived as typically "male" and therefore, women are stereotypically expected to perform worse than men, while they do not compete less then men in gender-neutral tasks.
We base our hypothesis on the psychological literature on stereotype threat (e.g. Steele 1997 , Steele & Aronson 1995 , Ryan & Ryan 2005 , Stangor et al. 1998 , Keller 2007 , Inzlicht & BenZeev 2000 . The contribution of our research therefore is to qualify the result that women compete less with respect to characteristics of the situation and the task.
To test our assumptions, we first replicated the experiment by Gneezy et al. (2003) . We then used the same paradigm, but with a "sex-neutral" task. Results confirm our hypotheses: In the "male" task, we replicate Gneezy et al.´s findings that women react less strongly than men to competitive incentives. For the "neutral" task however, this does not hold.
In the remainder of the paper Section 2 describes our experimental design and the procedure.
Section 3 reports the results and Section 4 concludes with a discussion.
Experimental design
To test our hypotheses, we used a 2x2-design (two tasks and two incentive schemes). The two tasks we call the "male" task and the "neutral" task.
In the male task, participants were asked to solve maze games. The games were solved with paper and pencil, tracking a pencil through mazes presented on individual sheets. The participants had 15 minutes time to solve a maximum of 20 mazes. The order of the mazes was fixed and the same for all participants. They received one point for each correctly solved maze. Points were transformed into payments depending on the incentive condition described below.
In the neutral task, the experimenters showed a slide with a letter on it. The participant's task now was to generate as many words as possible that started with this letter and write them on a previously prepared sheet. Each word could be used only once, i.e., it was not possible to use the adjective to a verb or use different forms of the same verb. Furthermore, names were not allowed. Participants received one point for each correct word, and these points were transformed into money depending on the incentive condition.
Why do we call one of these tasks "male" task and the other "neutral"?
Research on gender differences could establish only a few tasks were real differences in the performance of men and women could be observed (see e.g. Kimura 1999 Kimura , 2004 . But, stereotypes about what women and men are good at do exist. Women are in general slightly less good and thought to be significantly less good at tasks that require spatial resolution, like rotating objects or navigating their way through a route. An example of such a task is solving mazes.
Even though women are stereotypically thought to be better than men in all tasks requiring verbal abilities, this could not be proven. However, both men and women are convinced that this is the case. Kimura has shown that women outperform men only in some categories of verbal abilities, namely in verbal memory and verbal association capabilities, but not in verbal fluency. Our neutral task is a task requiring verbal fluency, and therefore it is not a task were women generally outperform men.
Finally, our entire experiment is not conducted using a computer due to the existence of the technological gender gap discussed by Canada & Brusca (1991) .
The two incentive conditions of our experiment were either competitive or random pay.
In the competitive condition, participants were organized in groups of six. They were instructed about the specific task they had to do (solving mazes or generating words). Further, the instructions explained that the person who performed best on the task in the whole group would be the winner of this group. The winner would get an amount of € 0.50 per solved maze and € 0.20 per generated word respectively, 4 in addition to the show up fee of € 3.-. The rest of the group would receive the show up fee of € 3.-only.
In the random pay condition, participants were also organized into groups of six, but now it depended on pure luck who became the "winner": it was determined by throwing a dice.
Participants were shown the dice beforehand and it was insured by the experimenters that participants knew that performance in the task had no influence on their chances to be "the winner". Payment was as in the competitive treatment -the person declared "winner" got performance based payment plus the show-up fee, while all others only received the show-up fee of € 3.-only. By using a random pay scheme instead of a piece rate payment scheme we ensured that our results are independent from attitudes towards risk (see Gneezy et al. 2003 ).
In the following we will name our treatments: male competitive (MC), male random (MR), neutral competitive (NC), and neutral random (NR).
Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Universitat Autónoma and the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain. Participants in each treatment were 24 female and 24 male students of different majors. Each session consisted of six male and six female participants.
The experiment was run as a paper-pencil experiment in large classrooms. Participants were seated separately from each other. After subjects had taken their seats in the classroom, they received the instructions which where also read aloud by the experimenter. Questions could be asked privately before the experiment started. For each treatment, we conducted four sessions; this resulted in 48 observations per treatment (24 observations per gender).
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Experimental Results
In order to allow a comparison of the different tasks we calculated for every subject the relative performance compared to all other subjects who were assigned to the same task, regardless of whether they played the competitive payment scheme or the random payment scheme. Throughout the section we use t-tests to investigate significances. Results do not qualitatively change if we used Mann-Whitney-U tests instead. Each significant result stays significant and non-significant results stay non-significant.
For the male task (maze games) we replicate the results of Gneezy et al. (2003) . In MR women performed only at a level of 89.6%, but not significantly less than men who performed at a level of 101.7% (t = .944, sig. 1-tailed = .175). In MC women performed at a level of 90.5%, while men performed at 120.1%, significantly better than women (t = 2.334, sig. 1-tailed = .012).
Looking at women only across treatments MR and MC yields that women do perform better under competition but this is far from significant (t = 0.072, sig. 1-tailed = .472). Men do improve significantly across treatments although the level of significance is quite weak (t = 1.412, sig. 1-tailed = .083). We conclude:
Result 1: In the male task, men do increase their performance in reaction to competitive pressure, but women do not.
The picture changes when we look at the neutral task. In NR women outperform men with 91.0% in contrast to 82.4%. This is, however, not significant (t = 0.794, sig. 2-tailed = .431) 6 .
In NC the performance of men and women is nearly equal; it is 113.2% for women and 113.4% for men. The difference is not significant (t = 0.018, sig. 2-tailed = 0.985).
When looking at the increase of performance in the neutral task across treatments, we find that women increase their performance significantly (t = 2.486, sig. 1-tailed = .008) as well as men do (t = 2.600, sig. = .006). Our second finding is:
5 In MR we had only 21 observations per sex due to some subjects not showing up. For the MC we decided to exclude one subject because he had an obvious drug problem. The decision was made before the analysis of the data. 6 We perform a two-tailed test of significance here because for the neutral task we do not have an expectation of the direction of the difference in performance between the sexes.
Result 2: In the neutral task, men as well as women increase their performance in reaction
to competitive pressure.
Discussion
The results confirm our assumption that stereotype threat plays a major role for the finding that women tend to avoid competition against men and improve performance to a lesser degree than men in situations of mixed gender competition. Even though most results on the topic reported so far are consistent with a "stereotype threat" explanation, to our knowledge none of the studies has analyzed this potential explanation systematically by varying the task and thus the related performance stereotype.
By doing exactly this we can show that it is not sex-composition per se that drives women's (or men's) reaction to competition, but that it plays an important role whether the task evokes a negative performance stereotype for women. We show that women do not improve performance in competition against men in a stereotypically "male" task. If however the task gives them the expectation of having an equal chance, they do improve performance in a competitive setting just as men do.
There remains, however, one puzzle to be solved: Why do men in our "neutral" condition not react with reduced performance, even though there exists a negative performance stereotype for men with respect to verbal tasks? One potential reason could be the importance of the task for their self-esteem. Aronson et al. (1999) have shown that stereotype threat does impair performance especially for people who have a high interest in the task or who see the task as highly important for their self-esteem or esteem from others. In our student sample, performance in a verbal task is probably rather low in importance for male participants. In an academic setting, typically "male" skills (being analytic, good knowledge of math and technical issues) are often more important for esteem than the type of verbal skills needed in our experiment. If interest in and importance of the task is low, stereotype threat usually has no negative effect on performance.
Another possible explanation comes from an evolutionary perspective. Consider the following very simplified role model that is predominant among (ancient) humans and more general with all mammals (Geary 1998) : Male fight for mating with female while female raise (suckle, breastfeed) the offspring. In order to have reproductive success, male have to engage in competition. Not competing makes them as worse off as losing a competition. On the other hand, female while raising the offspring should not engage in competition; particularly not when chances to lose seem to be high. Not competing offers a better payoff to them than loosing a competition with serious consequences to their offspring. Given this simple role model, stereotype threat that keeps someone from competing is more likely to survive evolutionary selection among female than among male.
The results of most other studies on gender differences in the reaction to competition we are aware of can be explained with stereotype threat. Most studies who find women to be less positively affected by competition than men use "stereotypically male tasks" (Datta Gupta et al. 2005 , Gneezy et al. 2003 , Niederle & Vesterlund 2007 , Vandegrift et al. 2004 . For some of the other studies the link with stereotype threat is less clear, as more factors play a role in these studies. Stereotype threat might play a subordinate role among other factors in the studies by Price (2006) , Gneezy & Rustichini (2004) and Antonovics et al. (2003) .
What alternative explanations could explain our results? The explanation most of the other studies favour is a lower general tendency of women to compete. We do, however, not replicate this finding for a task that includes no negative stereotype for female performance.
Stereotype threat therefore seems to be the most applicable explanation for the findings reported here. In fact, a kind of "double-stereotype threat" is possible for competitive situations in stereotypically male tasks. Being competitive in itself is regarded as stereotypically rather male, and in addition, being competitive in "male settings" for women still includes a negative stigma of being "bitchy". The pure fact of being in a competitive situation against men might lead to stereotype threat if the performance stereotype of the task at hand is not explicitly favourable for women. A favourable performance stereotype has been shown to lead to "stereotype boost" in some situations (Shih et al. 2002) -which might explain the large positive effect of competition on men when competing in a stereotypically male task against women.
With the focus on direct competition between the sexes, our study also contributes to the literature on stereotype threat. The psychological literature on stereotype threat usually uses specific ability tests, like math-tests, which are stereotypically associated with good or bad performance of a specific group. The studies then compare absolute performance of women compared to men in these tests, which are performed individually and not as a direct competition between members of the two sexes. Saliency of the stereotype, perceived diagnosticity of the task for a specific ability and perceived susceptibility of the task to gender bias have been shown to affect whether stereotype threat affects performance or not.
Direct competition between the sexes might have a double effect. Apart from the abovementioned direct effect through the stereotype of lower female ability to compete against men (without being perceived as bitchy), there may be an additional indirect effect. Having to compete against members of the opposite sex should make the sex-specific performance stereotype for the task at hand especially salient. This in turn should lead to a stronger effect of the stereotype threat on performance and might lead women who are conscious of this effect to refrain from competing against men (which is also in line with the results concerning choice of competitive situations by women, as reported in Niederle & Vesterlund 2007) .
Our findings have practical implications for dealing with the under-representation of women in high managerial positions. As most of the contexts where women are under-represented are stereotypically associated with superior male achievement, they are classical situations for stereotype threat. In addition, having to compete as such, which is stereotypically considered "male" behaviour, might be a situation of stereotype threat for women. Research on stereotype threat has shown that especially potential high achievers who strongly identify with the task at hand are susceptible to the negative effects of stereotype threat on performance (Aronson et al. 1999) . Therefore, especially potentially high performing women are expected to perform worse than equally or less qualified men, or avoid competing against men altogether.
Our research suggests that one way to reduce the gender gap in wages and positions could be to teach women strategies to cope with the effects of stereotype threat or to design mechanisms that help to avoid stereotype threat arising, such as is practiced in some symphony orchestras where job applicants play behind a curtain to avoid that judges know the gender of the player. Goldin & Rouse (2000) have shown that this practice enhances hiring of female musicians, and maybe techniques like this could not only reduce discrimination by employers, but could also reduce the effect of stereotype threat on women, leading overall to better performance of potentially high achieving women and more possibilities for them to reach top positions.
